Bitka za Emmendingen, 19. oktobra 1796

Bitka za Emmendingen, 19. oktobra 1796


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Bitka za Emmendingen, 19. oktobra 1796

Povlačenje na Rajnu
Teren
Austrijski položaji i planovi
Francuski plan
Bitka
20. oktobra

Bitka kod Emmendingena (19. listopada 1796.) bila je austrijska pobjeda koja je uklonila svaku šansu da je vojska Rajne i Mozela generala Moreaua uspjela zadržati uporište na istočnoj obali Rajne na kraju povlačenja iz južnoj Nemačkoj.

U ljeto 1796. Francuzi su započeli dvostranu invaziju na Njemačku. Moreau je stigao do predgrađa Minhena prije nego što je otkrio da je Jourdan poražen kod Amberga i Würzburga te da se povlači natrag prema Rajni. Moreau je započeo polako povlačenje natrag prema zapadu, a austrijska vojska pod generalom Latourom slijedila je iza njih. Moreau još nije bio spreman potpuno napustiti svoju kampanju, a 2. listopada se vratio i nanio skupocjen poraz Latouru kod Biberacha, ali je nadvojvoda Charles počeo prijetiti njegovoj pozadini i Moreau je bio prisiljen nastaviti povlačenje.

Povlačenje na Rajnu

Dan nakon pobjede kod Biberacha, Moreau je još uvijek bio u potencijalno opasnom položaju. Vojska Rajne i Mozele bila je osamdeset milja istočno od relativne sigurnosti doline Rajne, na južnim obalama Dunava. Da bi došli do Rajne, morali su prijeći dva planinska lanca - Alb i Schwarzwald. Latourova vojska je bila potučena kod Biberacha, ali nije uništena, i dalje je slijedila njihovo povlačenje. Generali Nauendorf i Petrasch pridružili su se u Hechingenu, na sjevernim padinama Alba. Austrijanci su također imali trupe sjeverno od Strasbourga na istočnoj obali Rajne, a konačni poraz Jourdanove vojske kod Altenkirchena (19. rujna) oslobodio je nadvojvodu Karla da krene na jug s pojačanjem.

Moreau se nadao da će preći Schwarzwald dolinom Kinzig, što bi ga dovelo do doline Rajne blizu Strasbourga, ali mu je ovaj put sada bio zatvoren. Umjesto toga, odlučio je koristiti Höllental. Ova dolina prelazi jedan od najviših dijelova Schwarzwalda, dvadeset milja sjeverno od švicarske granice, teče od Hinterzartena na istoku do Kirchzartena i Buchenbacha usred planina. Šira dolina zatim vodi prema zapadu do Freiburga im Breisgau, na rubu Rajnske nizije.

Ova ruta ubrzo je ostavila vojsku prilično rastegnutom. Dok se glavnina vojske kretala u Riedlingen, deset milja zapadno od Biberacha na Dunavu, prethodnica je prešla Alb i zauzela Villengen i Rothweit, prema južnom kraju jaza između Alba i Schwarzwalda. Lijevo krilo vojske slijedilo ih je preko i zauzelo položaj u Rothweitu, okrenuto prema sjeveru kako bi se zaštitilo od bilo kakvog poteza Nauendorfa. Desno krilo vojske premjestilo se u Tuttlingen, na južnom kraju Alba, i skrenulo na istok prema Latouru.

Središte vojske pod vodstvom Saint-Cyra prisililo je prolaz Höllentala. Dva austrijska bataljona koji su čuvali prijevoj, pod komandom pukovnika Aspresa, bili su prisiljeni povući se iz doline i u Emmendingen, šest milja sjeverno od Freiburga im Breisgau. Saint Cyr je ušao u Freiburg 12. oktobra, a ostatak vojske je sljedećih nekoliko dana krenuo preko prijevoja. Teža oprema krenula je južnijim putem i krenula je prema Huningueu, gotovo na švicarskoj granici, zaštićena Tharreauovom i Paillardovom brigadom, koja se borila protiv brojnih manjih akcija pozadine protiv lakih trupa generala Froelicha.

Moreauov sljedeći cilj bio je otvoriti komunikaciju s utvrđenim logorom u Kehlu, nasuprot Strasbourga, gdje je prvi put prešao Rajnu u junu. Umjesto da ponovno pređe Rajnu i napreduje uz zapadnu obalu Francuske do Strasbourga, odlučio je da se izbori uz istočnu obalu.

Teren

Bitka za Emmendingen odigrala se u dolini Elza. Ova dolina cik -cak prolazi svoj put kroz Schwarzwald prije nego što izlazi na Rajnsku ravnicu sjeverno od Freiburga u Breisgauu. Dio doline uključen u bitku prolazi jugozapadno kroz planine od Elzacha, preko Bleibacha i Waldkircha. Samo jugozapadno od Waldkircha rijeka izlazi iz planina i skreće desno, teče sjeverozapadno prema Rajni, sa Schwarzwaldom desno. Ovaj dio rijeke prolazi kroz Emmendingen i dolazi do Riegela. 1796. rijeka je skrenula na sjever kod Riegela i tekla paralelno sa Schwarzwaldom sve dok nije stigla do Rajne nešto sjevernije. Riegel sjedi u uskom prorezu između Schwarzwalda i izoliranog izdanaka vulkanskih brda poznatih kao Kaiserstuhl.

Austrijski položaji i planovi

Moreauove šanse za uspjeh u ovom pothvatu pogoršavale su se svakim danom koji je prolazio. 15. oktobra nadvojvoda Charles je stigao u Offenburg, petnaest milja jugoistočno od Kehla, gdje se pridružio lijevom krilu Petrascha i Nauenbourga. Latour je 17. oktobra izašao iz doline Kinzig, a 18. oktobra stigao je do logora Mahlberg, petnaest milja južnije. Condé i Froelich bili su u Neustadtu, na istočnom kraju Höllentala, a general Wolf bio je malo južnije, u Waldshutu. Nadvojvoda je prvobitno želio pokrenuti napad na Francuze 18. oktobra, ali je Laturovim ljudima trebao dan da se oporave od marša, pa je napad odložen za sljedeći dan.

Nadvojvoda je svoju vojsku podijelio u četiri kolone. General Nauendorff nalazio se u gornjoj dolini Elza sa 6.000 ljudi (8 bataljona i 14 eskadrila). Trebao je napredovati prema jugozapadu prema Waldkirchu.

Feldzeugmeister Wilhelm Graf Wartensleben sa 8 500 ljudi (12 bataljona i 23 eskadrile) trebao je napredovati prema jugu preko podnožja Schwarzwalda i zauzeti most Elz u Emmendingenu.

General Latour sa 6.000 ljudi (8 bataljona i 15 eskadrila) također je trebao prijeći podnožje Schwarzwalda preko Heimbacha i Malterdingena (istočno od Riegela) i zauzeti most Köndringen, na pola puta između Riegela i Emmendingena.

General Karl Alois, princ od Fürstenberga, držao je Kenzingen, 2-3 milje sjeverno od Riegela, na izvornom toku Elza. Naređeno mu je da izvede demonstracije protiv Riegela i da zaštiti Rust, Kappel i Grafenhausen, sjeverno od glavnog austrijskog položaja.

Južnije general Froelich i princ od Condéa trebali su ukopati generala Ferina i Francuze desno u dolini Stieg.

Francuski plan

Moreauov plan napada bio je gotovo točna slika austrijskog plana. General Delmas trebao je napasti Riegela, gdje će se sukobiti s princom od Fürstenberga.

General Beauput trebao je zauzeti visove Malterdingen (3 milje sjeverozapadno od Emmendingena) i Kondringen. Suočio bi se s Latourovom kolonom.

Prva podjela centra bila je da zadrži Emmendingen, gdje će ga napasti Wartensleben.

Saint-Cyr, s drugom podjelom centra, trebao je napasti sjeveroistočno uz dolinu Elza prema Bleibachu, gdje će prvo trčati u Nauendorff.

Napad bi obuhvatio samo središte njegove vojske, jer je general Desaix s lijevim krilom bio na jugu, dok je general Ferino, s desne strane, čuvao prijevoje preko Schwarzwalda. Kao rezultat toga, nadvojvoda je nadmašio Moreau, iako je u napadu bilo uključeno samo oko 20.000 Austrijanaca.

Bitka

Borbe u planinama krenule su putem Austrijanaca. U zoru je Saint-Cyr počeo napredovati uz dolinu Elza, dok se Nauendorf pripremao za kretanje niz dolinu. Saint-Cyr je odlučio poslati drugu malu kolonu preko planina istočno od doline, ciljajući na selo Simonswald, smješteno u sporednoj dolini. Nadao se da će ta sila pogoditi Nauendorfovu lijevu stranu i natjerati ga da se povuče iz Bleibacha. Na nesreću Francuza, Nauendorf je postavio bokove na uzvišenjima uz dolinu Elza, a austrijske strijelce zasjedali su Saint-Cyrovi ljudi. S druge strane doline Elz, više austrijskih strijelaca doseglo je dominantnu poziciju u Kolnauu, koji je previdio Waldkirch. Saint-Cyr je bio prisiljen otkazati avans na Bleibach i povukao se u Waldkirch. Nauendorf ga je nastavio gurati, a Saint-Cyr je bio prisiljen povući se još dvije milje do Denzlingena.

Oko podneva Latourove dvije kolone napale su Beaupuya kod Matterdingena. Beaupuy je poginuo u ranim borbama, što je dovelo do zabune što je dovelo do toga da njegova divizija nije dobila naređenje da se povuče uz Elz u Wasser, južno od Emmendingena.

Wartensleben, u austrijskom centru, trebao je cijeli dan da se izbori za Emmendingen. Dvije njegove kolone držali su francuski strijelci postavljeni u šumi Landecka, dvije milje sjeverno od Emmendingena, a i sam je teško ranjen. Francuzi su na kraju bili prisiljeni povući se kasno u dan kada je treća kolona Wartenslebena zaprijetila da će zaobići njihovo desno. Francuzi su se zatim povukli preko rijeke uništavajući mostove iza sebe.

Na kraju dana Moreau je bio u vrlo lošem položaju. Delmas se nalazio u Riegelu i Endingenu, na sjeveroistočnom uglu Kaiserstuhla. Saint-Cyr je desno bio iza Denzlingena, a lijevo kod Unterreute. Francuski centar bio je u Nimburgu, na pola puta između Riegela i Unterreutea. Francuska linija gledala je sjeveroistočno prema Austrijancima. Preko noći 19. i 20. oktobra Austrijanci su popravljali most u Emmendingenu, a do jutra 20. oktobra nadvojvoda se utaborio blizu Denzlingena.

20. oktobra

Moreau je 20. oktobra konačno odustao od bilo kakvih planova za napredovanje uz istočnu obalu Rajne. Desaixu je naređeno da pređe Rajnu u Brisachu (na južnom kraju Kaiserstuhla i deset milja zapadno od Freiburga) i napreduje na sjever prema Strasbourgu i Kehlu.

Francuski centar povukao se sa svojih najnaprednijih položaja i zauzeo novu poziciju iza Dresiam -a (potok koji teče od Freiburga sjeverno do Riegela). Ferino, s desnim krilom vojske, još je bio u dolini Saint-Pierre, a ako bi Francuzi izgubili Freiburg, bio bi zarobljen između Condéa i Froelicha u dolini i nadvojvode na ravnicama.

Francuzi su se uz Dresiam držali tek toliko da Ferino dospije na sigurno. Condé i Froelich bili su blizu, a kad su otvorili vatru na francusku desnicu u Freiburgu Saint-Cyr je konačno bio prisiljen povući se. Dalje na sjeverozapadu Latour se probio kroz Dresiam u svom četvrtom pokušaju, a princ od Fürstenburga zauzeo je Riegel.

Francuzi su se povukli oko visova Pfaffenweilera, a zatim su se povukli prema mostu u Huningueu, blizu Baslea. Moreau je 22. oktobra stigao do Schliengena, deset milja sjeverno od Huninguea, i odlučio se zauzeti da prekrije svoje povlačenje preko rijeke.

Napoleonova početna stranica | Knjige o Napoleonovim ratovima | Indeks predmeta: Napoleonovi ratovi


Bitka za Emmendingen, 19. oktobra 1796. - Historija

U bitci za Emmendingen, 19. listopada 1796. godine, francuska vojska Rhin-et-Moselle pod vodstvom Jean Victora Marie Moreau borila se protiv Prve koalicijske vojske Gornje Rajne kojom je zapovijedao nadvojvoda Charles, vojvoda od Teschena. Emmendingen se nalazi na rijeci Elz u Baden-Württembergu u Njemačkoj, sjeverno od Freiburga im Breisgau. Radnja se dogodila za vrijeme rata prve koalicije, prve faze većih ratova za revoluciju u Francuskoj. Nakon ljeta pariranja između dvije strane, Francuzi su se već povlačili kroz Schwarzwald prema Rajni. U bliskoj potrazi, Austrijanci su natjerali francuskog zapovjednika da podijeli svoje snage kako bi mogao preći Rajnu u tri tačke preko mostova u Kehlu, Breisachu i Hüningenu. Međutim, do sredine rujna Austrijanci su kontrolirali prilaze prijelazima u Breisachu i Kehlu. Moreau je i dalje želio da se polovina njegove vojske približi Austrijancima kod Kehla. Neravni teren u Emmendingenu zakomplicirao je borbe, što je omogućilo habsburškim snagama da snajperiraju francuske trupe i da blokiraju svaki prolaz prema Kehlu po kišnom i hladnom vremenu dodatno su ometale napore obje strane, pretvarajući potoke i rječice u navale vodenih bujica , i učiniti puteve klizavim. Borbe su bile žestoke. U bici su poginula dva generala, po jedan sa svake strane. Habsburški uspjeh u Emmendingenu natjerao je Francuze da odustanu od svojih planova za trostruko, ili čak dvosmjerno povlačenje. Francuzi su nastavili povlačenje kroz planinske gradove Schwarzwald na jugu, gdje su se vojske pet dana kasnije borile u bitci za Schliengen.

U početku su evropski vladari na Francusku revoluciju gledali kao na spor između francuskog kralja i njegovih podanika, a ne na nešto u što bi se trebali miješati. Kako je revolucionarna retorika postajala sve oštrija, proglasili su interes europskih monarha kao jednog s interesima Luja XVI i njegove porodice, ova Pillnitzova deklaracija (27. kolovoza 1791.) prijetila je dvosmislenim, ali prilično ozbiljnim posljedicama ako se bilo što dogodi Kraljevska porodica. Položaj revolucionara postajao je sve teži. Komplicirajući svoje probleme u međunarodnim odnosima, francuski emigranti nastavili su agitirati za podršku kontrarevoluciji. Konačno, 20. aprila 1792. godine, Francuska nacionalna konvencija objavila je Austriji rat. U ovom ratu prve koalicije (1792–1798), Francuska se suprotstavila većini evropskih država koje dijele kopnene ili vodene granice s njom, plus Portugal i Osmansko carstvo. Timothy Blanning. „Francuski revolucionarni ratovi“, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, str. 41–59. Uprkos nekim pobjedama 1792., početkom 1793. Francuska je bila u krizi: francuske snage su istisnute iz Belgije, francuski kralj je upravo pogubljen, a u Vandeji je došlo do pobune zbog regrutacije i široko rasprostranjenog nezadovoljstva građanskim ustavom sveštenstva. Vojske Francuske Republike bile su u stanju poremećaja, a problemi su postali još akutniji nakon uvođenja masovne vojne obveze, '' levée en masse '', koja je zasitila već uznemirenu vojsku sa hiljadama nepismenih, neobučenih ljudi. Za Francuze, Rajnska kampanja iz 1795. pokazala se posebno katastrofalnom, iako su postigli izvjestan uspjeh u drugim ratnim pozorištima, uključujući Pirinejski rat (1793–1795). Vojske Prve koalicije uključivale su carske kontingente i pješadiju i konjicu različitih država, u ukupnom iznosu od oko 125 000 (uključujući tri autonomna korpusa), značajnu silu prema standardima osamnaestog stoljeća, ali umjerenu silu po standardima revolucionara i Napoleona ratova. Sveukupno, trupe vrhovnog zapovjednika nadvojvode Karla protezale su se od Švicarske do Sjevernog mora i Dagoberta Sigmunda von Wurmsera, od švicarsko-talijanske granice do Jadrana. Habsburške trupe činile su većinu vojske, ali "tanka bijela linija" Gunther E. Rothenberg, "Habsburška vojska u Napoleonovim ratovima (1792–1815)". '' Vojna pitanja '', 37: 1 (februar 1973), str. 1 & ndash5, str. 2 citirano. pješaštvo koalicije nije moglo pokriti teritorij od Basela do Frankfurta dovoljnom dubinom da se odupre pritisku svojih protivnika. U poređenju sa pokrivanjem Francuske, Charles je imao upola manji broj vojnika za pokrivanje fronta koji se protezao od Renchena blizu Basela do Bingena. Nadalje, glavninu svojih snaga, kojima je zapovijedao grof Baillet Latour, koncentrirao je između Karlsruhea i Darmstadta, gdje je ušće Rajne i Majne izvršilo napad, a rijeke su vjerovatno imale izlaz u države istočne Njemačke, a na kraju u Beč, s dobrim mostovima koji prelaze relativno dobro definiranu obalu rijeke. Na njegovom sjeveru, autonomni korpus Wilhelma von Wartenslebena pokrivao je liniju između Mainza i Giessena. Austrijsku vojsku činili su profesionalci, mnogi dovedeni iz pograničnih regija na Balkanu, i ročnici regrutirani iz carskih krugova.

Nastavak borbi: 1796

U januaru 1796. godine, Francuzi i članovi Prve koalicije raspisali su primirje, okončavši Rajnsku kampanju 1795. godine, za koju su shvatili da je privremena. Theodore Ayrault Dodge, "Rat u doba Napoleona: Revolucionarni ratovi protiv prve koalicije u Sjevernoj Europi i Talijanska kampanja, 1789–1797." Leonaur, 2011. str. 286–287 Blanning, str. 41–59 . Ovaj sporazum trajao je do 20. maja 1796. godine, kada su Austrijanci objavili da će prestati 31. maja. Koaliciona armija Donje Rajne uključivala je 90.000 vojnika, uglavnom habsburških i '' Reichsarmee '' (carskih) trupa okupljenih iz država Svetog Rimskog Carstva. Desno krilo od 20.000 ljudi pod vojvodom Ferdinandom Frederickom Augustusom od Württemberga stajalo je na istočnoj obali Rajne iza rijeke Sieg, promatrajući francuski mostobran u Düsseldorfu. Garnizoni tvrđave Mainz i tvrđave Ehrenbreitstein brojali su još 10.000. Charles je postavio ostatak snaga Habsburga i koalicije na zapadnoj obali iza Nahea. Dagobert Sigmund von Wurmser predvodio je 80.000 armiju Gornje Rajne. Njegovo desno krilo zauzimalo je Kaiserslautern na zapadnoj obali, a lijevo pod Antonom Sztárayom, Michaelom von Fröhlichom i Louisom Josefom, princom od Condéa koji su čuvali Rajnu od Mannheima do Švicarske. Prvotna strategija koalicije bila je zauzimanje Trira i korištenje položaja na zapadnoj obali za redni udar na svaku od francuskih armija. Međutim, u Beč su stigle vijesti o Bonapartovim uspjesima. Preispitujući situaciju, Vijeće Aulika je nadvojvodi Karlu naredilo obje austrijske vojske i naredilo mu da zadrži svoju poziciju te je poslalo Wurmsera u Italiju sa 25.000 pojačanja. Gubitak Wurmsera i njegovih trupa znatno je oslabio koalicijske snage. Na francuskoj strani, vojska Sambre-et-Meuse od 80.000 ljudi držala je zapadnu obalu Rajne do Nahea, a zatim jugozapadno do Sankt Wendela. Na lijevom boku vojske, Jean-Baptiste Kléber imao je 22.000 vojnika u ukorijenjenom logoru u Düsseldorfu. Desno krilo vojske Rhin-et-Moselle bilo je pozicionirano iza Rajne od Hüningena prema sjeveru, njegovo središte je bilo uz rijeku Queich u blizini Landaua, a njegovo lijevo krilo se prostiralo prema zapadu prema Saarbrückenu. Pierro Marie Barthélemy Ferino predvodio je Moreauovo desno krilo, Louis Desaix je zapovijedao centrom, a Laurent Gouvion Saint-Cyr lijevim krilom. Ferino krilo sastojalo se od tri pješačke i konjičke divizije pod François Antoine Louis Bourcier -om i Henri François Delabordeom. Desaixova komanda brojala je tri divizije koje su predvodili Michel de Beaupuy, Antoine Guillaume Delmas i Charles Antoine Xaintrailles. Krilo Saint-Cyr imalo je dvije divizije kojima su komandovali Guillaume Philibert Duhesme i Taponier. Francuski veliki plan zahtijevao je da dvije francuske vojske pritisnu bokove sjevernih armija u njemačkim državama, dok se istovremeno treća armija približila Beču preko Italije. Jourdanova vojska gurnula bi se jugoistočno od Düsseldorfa, namjeravajući privući trupe i pažnju na sebe, što bi Moreauovoj vojsci omogućilo lakši prelazak Rajne između Kehla i Hüningena. Prema planu, Jourdanova vojska se nametnula prema Mannheimu, a Charles je brzo ponovno pridružio svoje trupe. Moreauova vojska napala je mostobran u Kehlu, koji je čuvalo 7.000 carskih trupa - trupe koje su tog proljeća regrutirane iz švapskih krugova, neiskusne i neobučene - koje su zadivljujuće držale mostobran nekoliko sati, ali su se zatim povukle prema Rastattu. Moreau je 23. - 24. juna ojačao mostobran svojim prednjim štitnikom. Nakon što su potisnuli carsku miliciju s mjesta na mostobranu, njegove trupe neometano su se slile u Baden. Slično, na jugu, uz Basel, Ferino kolona se brzo kretala preko rijeke i nastavila uz Rajnu duž švicarske i njemačke obale, prema Bodenskom jezeru i na južnom kraju Schwarzwalda. Zabrinut da će njegove linije opskrbe biti prenadužene, Charles je počeo povlačenje na istok. U ovom trenutku nastupila je urođena ljubomora i konkurencija među generalima. Moreau se mogao pridružiti Jourdanovoj vojsci na sjeveru, ali nije nastavio prema istoku, gurnuvši Charlesa u Bavarsku. Jourdan se također kretao prema istoku, gurnuvši autonomni korpus Wartenslebena u Ernestinska vojvodstva, a činilo se da nijedan general nije voljan ujediniti svoj bok sa svojim sunarodnikom. Dodge, str. 292–293. Uslijedilo je ljeto strateških povlačenja, bočnih i ponovnih manevara. Sa obe strane, unija dve vojske - Wartenslebenove sa Charlesovom ili Jourdanove sa Moreauovom - mogla je slomiti opoziciju. Dodge, str. 297. Wartensleben i Charles su se prvo ujedinili, a plima se okrenula protiv Francuza. Sa 25.000 svojih najboljih vojnika, nadvojvoda je prešao na sjevernu obalu Dunava u Regensburgu i krenuo na sjever kako bi se pridružio svom kolegi Wartenslebenu. Poraz Jourdanove vojske u bitkama kod Amberga, Würzburga i Altenkirchena omogućio je Charlesu da premjesti više trupa na jug. Sljedeći kontakt dogodio se 19. oktobra u Emmendingenu. J. Rickard
'' Bitka za Emmendingen ''
Historija rata
17. februar 2009. Pristupljeno 18. novembra 2014.

Emmendingen leži u dolini Elz, koja vijuga kroz Schwarzwald. Elz stvara niz visećih dolina koje izazivaju prolaz velikih trupa, kišno vrijeme dodatno je zakompliciralo prolaz kroz dolinu Elz. Područje oko Riegel am Kaiserstuhla poznato je po lesu i uskim prijelaznim točkama, koje su uvelike utjecale na bitku.

Veći dio francuske vojske raskrinkao se kroz dolinu Höll. Desaixovo lijevo krilo uključivalo je devet bataljona i 12 eskadrila divizije St. Suzanne od Riegela, koje se prostiru na obje obale Elza. Desno, između Malterdingena i Emmendingena, Beaupuy je zapovijedao divizijom od 12 bataljona i 12 eskadrila. Dalje s desne strane, pored samog Emmendingena, a u visinama pored Heimbacha, stajao je Saint-Cyr oko ove protezane divizije Duhesme (12 bataljona i osam eskadrila). Dalje desno od njih, u dolini Elza kraj Waldkircha, stajala je Ambertova divizija i Girardova brigada kod Zähringena, otprilike milju dalje, Lecourbeova brigada je stajala u rezervi, a, protežući se sjeverno odatle, jedna divizija od 14 000 lutala je u blizini Holzhausen (danas dio ožujka, Breisgau). Ove pozicije stvorile su dugačku liniju. S druge strane Lecorbeove brigade stajalo je 15 Ferinovih bataljona i 16 eskadrila, ali oni su bili dobro južno i istočno od Freiburga u Breisgauu, još uvijek gazeći kroz planine. Svima su otežale obilne kiše tlo je bilo mekano i klizavo, a rijeke Rajna i Elz su poplavile, kao i mnoge pritoke. Ovo je povećalo opasnosti od montiranog napada, jer konji nisu mogli ustaliti. Johann Samuel Ersch
'' Allgemeine encyclopädie der wissenschaften und künste in alphabetischer folge von genannten schrifts bearbeitet und herausgegeben ''
Leipzig, J. F. Gleditsch, 1889, str. 64–66. Nasuprot tome stajala je nadvojvodina sila. Kada je stigao do nekoliko milja Emmendingena, nadvojvoda je podijelio svoju snagu u četiri kolone. Kolona Nauendorf, u gornjem Elzu, imala je osam bataljona i 14 eskadrila, napredujući jugozapadno do Waldkirch Wartensleben je imala 12 bataljona i 23 eskadrile koje su napredovale na jug kako bi zauzele most Elz u Emmendingenu. Latour je sa 6.000 ljudi trebao prijeći podnožje preko Heimbacha i Malterdingena i zauzeti most Köndringen, između Riegela i Emmendingena, a kolona Fürstenberg držala je Kinzingen, sjeverno od Riegela. Frölich i Condé (dio Nauendorfove kolone) dobili su upute da privedu Ferina i francusko desno krilo u dolini Stieg.

Prvi koji su stigli u Emmindingen, Francuzi su osigurali vrhunac u Waldkirchu, koji je komandovao susjednim dolinama za koje se u to vrijeme smatralo da je maksima vojne taktike, da je komanda nad planinama dala kontrolu nad dolinama. Do 19. oktobra, vojske su se suočile, na obalama Elza od Waldkircha do Emmendingena. Moreau je do tada znao da ne može nastaviti do Kehla uz desnu obalu Rajne, pa je odlučio prijeći Rajnu sjevernije, u Breisachu. Međutim, tamošnji most je bio mali i cijela njegova vojska nije mogla prijeći bez izazivanja uskog grla, pa je poslao samo lijevo krilo, kojim je zapovijedao Desaix, da pređe tamo. Archibald Alison (Sir Archibald Alison, 1. baronet) "Historija Evrope", ondon W. Blackwood i sinovi, 1835, str. 86 & ndash90. U zoru je Saint-Cyr (francuski desno) napredovao dolinom Elza. Nauendorf je bio spreman premjestiti svoje habsburške snage niz dolinu. Vidjevši to, Saint-Cyr je poslao malu kolonu preko planina istočno od glavne doline, u selo Simonswald, smješteno u sporednoj dolini. Uputio ih je da napadnu Nauendorfovu ljevicu i prisile ga da se povuče iz Bleibacha. Predviđajući ovo, Nauendorf je već postavio jedinice na uzvišenjima duž doline Elz, odakle su austrijski strijelci zasjedili ljude Saint-Cyra. S druge strane doline Elz, više habzburških naoružanih ljudi stiglo je do Kollnaua, koji je gledao na Waldkirch, i odatle su mogli pucati na francuske snage. Borbe su bile brze i žestoke. Nadmoćni austrijski položaji primorali su Saint-Cyra da otkaže napredovanje prema Bleibachu i povuče se u Waldkirch čak i tamo, iako su ga Nauendorfovi ljudi nastavili maltretirati, a Saint-Cyr se povukao u relativnu sigurnost Denzlingena. Borbe nisu bile ništa bolje za Francuze s njihove lijeve strane. Decaenov napredni čuvar nastavio je naprijed, iako oprezno. Austrijski strelci pucali su na kolonu, a Decaen je pao s konja, ozlijeđen. Beaupuy je preuzeo Decaenovo mjesto s prethodnikom. Phipps, sv. II, str. 380 & ndash385. U podne, Latour je napustio uobičajenu opreznost i poslao dvije kolone da napadnu Beaupuy između Malterdingena i Höllentala (Val d'Enfer), što je rezultiralo žestokom vatrom. Nakon što je izdao naređenje za povlačenje uz Elz, Beaupuy je ubijen, a njegova divizija nije primila naredbu za povlačenje, što je Francuzima nanijelo dodatne gubitke. U sredini su francuski strijelci postavljeni u šumi Landeck, sjeverno od Emmendingena, držali dva Wartenslebenova odreda, dok se njegov treći borio po blatnjavim, gotovo neprohodnim putevima. Wartenslebenovim ljudima je trebalo cijeli dan da se bore za put do Emmendingena, a tokom pucnjave, lijeva ruka Wartenslebena je razbijena loptom muškete. Konačno, kasno tokom dana, stigla je treća kolona Wartenslebena i zaprijetila da će zaobići Francuze desno, Francuzi su se povukli preko rijeke Elz, uništavajući mostove iza sebe. Alison, str. 86 & ndash90 Phipps, Vol. II, str. 278. Na kraju današnjih borbi, Moreauove snage bile su u nesigurnom položaju. S lijeva na desno, Francuzi su bili rastegnuti duž nazubljene, isprekidane linije otprilike. Decaenova divizija stajala je u Riegelu i Endingenu, na sjeveroistočnom uglu Kaiserstuhla, i više nije pomagala većinu Moreauovih snaga. Moreau je također izgubio energičnog i obećavajućeg oficira u Beaupuyu. Desno, Saint-Cyr-ova divizija stajala je iza Denzlingena, a lijevo se protezalo do Unterreutea, tanke linije koja se također odvajala od centra, u Nimburgu (blizu Tenningena i Landecka), na pola puta između Riegela i Unterreutea. Francuska linija okrenuta je prema sjeveroistoku prema Austrijancima, unatoč uspjesima Habsburga tokom cijelog dana, snage Koalicije nisu mogle zaobići francusku liniju, pa su se Francuzi, prema tome, uspjeli povući u relativno dobrom redu na jug.

Bilješke, citati i abecedni popis izvora

Abecedni popis izvora

* Alison, Archibald (Sir Archibald Alison, prvi barun). '' Historija Evrope. '' London: W. Blackwood i sinovi, 1835. *Blanning, Timothy. '' Francuski revolucionarni ratovi. '' New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, * Charles, nadvojvoda Austrijski
'' Ausgewählte Schriften weiland seiner kaiserlichen Hoheit des Erzherzogs Carl von Österreich. ''
Beč, W. Braumüller, 1893–94. . * Dodge, Theodore Ayrault. '' Ratovanje u doba Napoleona: Revolucionarni ratovi protiv prve koalicije u Sjevernoj Europi i Talijanska kampanja, 1789. -1797. '' Leonaur, 2011.. * Dupuy, Roger. '' La période jacobine: terreur, guerre et gouvernement révolutionnaire: 1792 & ndash1794 '', Pariz, Seuil, 2005. * Ersch, Johann Samuel
'' Allgemeine encyclopädie der wissenschaften und künste in alphabetischer folge von genannten schrifts bearbeitet und herausgegeben ''
Leipzig, J. F. Gleditsch, 1889. *Gates, David. '' Napoleonovi ratovi 1803–1815, '' New York, Random House, 2011. *Graham, Thomas, Baron Lynedoch
'' Povijest kampanje 1796. u Njemačkoj i Italiji. ''
London, 1797.. * Haythornthwaite, Philipe. '' Austrijska vojska Napoleonovih ratova (1): pješadija. '' Osprey Publishing, 2012. * Huot, Paul. '' Des Vosges au Rhin, excursions et causeries alsaciennes, '' Veuve Berger-Levrault & Fils, Pariz, 1868. * Phipps, Ramsay Weston. '' Vojske Prve Francuske Republike: Tom II, Armées du Moselle, du Rhin, de Sambre-et-Meuse, de Rhin-et-Moselle '' SAD: Pickle Partners Publishing 2011. pretisak originalne publikacije 1920–32. * Rickard, J
'' Bitka za Emmendingen ''
Historija rata
17. februar 2009. Pristupljeno 18. novembra 2014. *Rothenburg, Gunther. "Habsburška vojska u Napoleonovim ratovima (1792–1815)". „Vojna pitanja“, 37: 1 (februar 1973), str. 1–5. *Schroeder, Paul W. '' Transformacija Evrope, 1763–1848 '', Clarendon, 1996., poglavlja 2-3. * Smith, Digby. '' Knjiga podataka o Napoleonovim ratovima. '' Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 1999. * Wurzbach, Constant von. '' Biographisches Lexikon des Kaisertums Österreich '' 53. Beč, 1886. *Vann, James Allen. '' Švapski Kreis: Institucionalni rast u Svetom Rimskom Carstvu 1648-1715. '' Vol. LII, Studije predstavljene Međunarodnoj komisiji za istoriju predstavničkih i parlamentarnih institucija. Bruxelles, 1975. *Walker, Mack. '' Njemački domovi: zajednica, država i opća dobra, 1648. -1871. '' Ithaca, 1998. <

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Amerikanci su porazili Britance u Yorktownu

Beznadežno zarobljen u Yorktownu u Virdžiniji, britanski general Lord Cornwallis predaje 8.000 britanskih vojnika i pomoraca većim francusko-američkim snagama, čime je okončan američka revolucija.

Lord Cornwallis bio je jedan od najsposobnijih britanskih generala američke revolucije. Godine 1776. istjerao je snage Patriotsa generala Georgea Washingtona iz New Jerseyja, a 1780. godine odnio je zadivljujuću pobjedu nad vojskom generala Horacija Gatesa#Patriot#x2019 u Camdenu u Južnoj Karolini. Kasnija invazija Cornwallisa ’ na Sjevernu Karolinu bila je manje uspješna, pa je u travnju 1781. poveo svoje umorne i izudarane trupe prema obali Virginije, gdje je mogao održavati pomorske linije komunikacije s velikom britanskom vojskom generala Henryja Clintona u New Yorku Grad. Nakon što je izveo niz napada na gradove i plantaže u Virdžiniji, Cornwallis se u kolovozu smjestio u gradić Yorktown. Britanci su odmah počeli sa utvrđivanjem grada i susjednog rta Gloucester Point preko rijeke York.

General George Washington naložio je markizu de Lafayetteu, koji je bio u Virdžiniji sa američkom vojskom od oko 5.000 ljudi, da blokira Cornwallis ’ kopnenim bijegom. U međuvremenu, 2.500 vojnika Washingtona u New Yorku pridružila se francuska vojska od 4.000 ljudi pod grofom de Rochambeauom. Washington i Rochambeau skovali su planove za napad na Cornwallis uz pomoć velike francuske flote pod grofom de Grasseom, a 21. avgusta prešli su rijeku Hudson kako bi marširali na jug do Yorktowna. Prevalivši 200 milja u 15 dana, savezničke snage su početkom septembra stigle na čelo zaliva Chesapeake.

U međuvremenu, britanska flota pod vođstvom admirala Thomasa Gravesa nije uspjela slomiti francusku pomorsku superiornost u bitci kod Cape Virginia 5. septembra, uskrativši Cornwallisu njegova očekivana pojačanja. Od 14. septembra, de Grasse je transportirao Washington i Rochambeauove ljude niz Chesapeake u Virdžiniju, gdje su se pridružili Lafayette -u i 28. septembra završili opkoljavanje Yorktowna. De Grasse je iskrcao još 3.000 francuskih vojnika koje je nosila njegova flota. U prve dvije sedmice oktobra 14.000 francusko-američkih vojnika postepeno je savladalo utvrđene britanske položaje uz pomoć de Grasseovih ratnih brodova. Velika britanska flota sa 7.000 ljudi krenula je spasiti Cornwallis, ali bilo je prekasno.

General Cornwallis predao je 19. oktobra 7.087 oficira i ljudi, 900 pomoraca, 144 topa, 15 galija, fregatu i 30 transportnih brodova. Izlažući se bolesti, nije prisustvovao ceremoniji predaje, ali njegov zamjenik, general Charles O ’Hara, odnio je Cornwallisov#mač američkim i francuskim zapovjednicima. Dok su britanske i hesenske trupe marširale da se predaju, britanski bendovi svirali su pjesmu “Svijet se okrenuo naglavačke. ”

Iako je rat trajao na otvorenom moru i u drugim kazalištima, pobjeda Patriota kod Yorktowna efektivno je okončala borbe u američkim kolonijama. Mirovni pregovori započeli su 1782. godine, a 3. septembra 1783. potpisan je Pariški ugovor, kojim su Sjedinjene Države formalno priznate kao slobodna i nezavisna nacija nakon osam godina rata.


Berze imaju najveći jednodnevni krah ikada "na crni ponedjeljak"

Najveći jednodnevni pad industrijskog prosjeka Dow Jones-a ne dolazi 1929. godine, već 19. oktobra 1987. Kako su se brojni nepovezani događaji urotili na svjetska tržišta, Dow je pao za 508 bodova �,6 posto —in panika koja je nagovijestila veća sistemska pitanja.

Povjerenje na Wall Streetu raslo je tokom 1980-ih, kako je ekonomija izlazila iz krize, a predsjednik Ronald Reagan provodio politiku povoljnu za poslovanje. In October 1987, however, indicators began to suggest that the bull market of the last five years was coming to an end. The government reported a surprisingly large trade deficit, precipitating a decline in the U.S. Dollar. Congress revealed it was considering closing tax loopholes for corporate mergers, worrying investors who were used to loose regulation.

As these concerns grew, Iran attacked two oil tankers off of Kuwait and a freak storm paralyzed England, closing British markets early on the Friday before the crash. The following Monday, U.S. investors awoke to news of turmoil in Asian and European markets, and the Dow began to tumble.

Further compounding the crash was the practice of program trading, the programming of computers to automatically execute trades under certain conditions. Once the rush to sell began, matters were quite literally out of traders’ hands and machines escalated the damage to the market.

Despite looking like the beginning of another Great Depression—the L.A. Times’ headline read �lam on Wall St.” while the New York Daily News’ simply read “PANIC!,” Black Monday has been largely forgotten by Americans not versed in financial history. As it would again in 2008, the federal government took a number of measures to 𠇌orrect” the market, resulting in immediate gains over the next few weeks. By 1989, the market appeared to have made a full recovery. 

Some now interpret the events surrounding Black Monday as proof that boom-and-bust cycles are natural and healthy aspects of modern economics, while others believe it was a missed opportunity to examine and regulate the kind of risky behaviors that led to the crash of 2008.


“Take on Me” music video helps Norway’s A-ha reach the top the U.S. pop charts

From its beginnings in the early 1980s, it was clear that MTV, the Music Television Network, would have a dramatic effect on the way pop stars marketed their music and themselves. While radio remained a necessary engine to drive the sales and chart rankings of singles and albums, the rise of new artists like Duran Duran and the further ascent of established stars like Michael Jackson showed that creativity and esthetic appeal on MTV could make a direct and undeniable contribution to a musical performer’s commercial success. But if ever a case existed in which MTV did more than just contribute to an act’s success, it was the case of the Norwegian band a-Ha, who went from total unknowns to chart-topping pop stars almost solely on the strength of the groundbreaking video for the song “Take On Me,” which hit #1 on the Bilbord pop chart on October 19, 1985.

By 1985 the medium was established enough that it took a unique angle to achieve music video stardom. Enter a-Ha, a synth-pop group that caught a late ride on the dying New Wave thanks to the video for “Take On Me,” in which lead singer Morten Harket was transformed using a decades-old technology called Rotoscoping. The creators of the “Take On Me” video painted portions or sometimes the entirety of individual frames to create the effect of a dashingly handsome comic-book motorcycle racer (Harket) romancing a pretty girl from the real world, fighting off a gang of angry pursuers in a pipe-wrench fight before bursting out of the comic-book world as a dashingly handsome real boy.


A Forgotten Army The Irish Yeomanry

‘Peep O’Day Boys’, from Daly’s Ireland in 󈨦(1888). Despite the title the uniforms suggest that villians in the picture are Yeomanry, a reflection of their notoriety in folk memory.

In September 1796, Ireland was pregnant with expectation. The United Irishmen and Defenders planned insurrection and a French invasion was imminent. On 19 September Dublin Castle announced plans to follow Britain’s lead and enlist civilian volunteers as a yeomanry force. In October commissions were issued to local gentlemen and magistrates empowering them to raise cavalry troops and infantry companies. Recruits took the ‘Yeomanry oath’, were officered by the local gentry but were paid, clothed, armed and controlled by government. Their remit was to free the regular army and militia from domestic peacekeeping and do garrison duty if invasion meant troops had to move
to the coast. Service was part-time—usually two ‘exercise days’ per week—except during emergencies when they were called up on ‘permanent duty’.

Folk memory

If the Irish Yeomanry are remembered at all it is usually for their notoriety in the bloody summer of 1798. The popular folk memory of every area which saw action supplies lurid stories from the burning of Father John Murphy’s corpse in a tar barrel at Tullow to the sabreing and mutilation of Betsy Gray after the battle of Ballynahinch. Until recently, the Yeomen have been largely written out of history, apart from early nineteenth century polemics where they appear either as a brutal mob making ‘croppies’ lie down or latter day Williamite saviours. Such neglect belies the Irish Yeomanry’s real significance.
When Belfast’s White Linen Hall was demolished in 1896 to make way for City Hall a glass phial containing a scroll bearing Volunteer reform resolutions was found in its foundations. Two years later another demolition occurred. Ballynahinch loyalists smashed the monument on Betsy Gray’s grave to prevent a 1798 centenary celebration by Belfast Home Rulers. Volunteer radicalism was hermetically sealed in the past while the passions and polarisation engendered in the later 1790s lived and breathed. The Irish Yeomanry played a key role in this critical transition which saw ancient antipathies sharpen and re-assert their baleful influence after a period of relative calm. The ‘Age of Reason’ had briefly promised a brave new world in Ireland. In the 1780s, radical Volunteers favoured Catholic relief along with parliamentary reform. The Boyne Societies, founded to perpetuate the Williamite cause, charged toasting glasses rather than muskets. However the prospect of revolutionary change proved too much to swallow.

Flag of the Lower lveagh Yeoman Cavalry.
(Reproduced with the kind permission of the Trustees of the Ulster Museum, Belfast)

The force raised in 1796 actually bore much more resemblance to the Volunteers, praised by United Irish writers Myles Byrne and Charles Teeling, than to the reactionary and bigoted organisation portrayed in their rebellion histories. In reality, loyalism in 1796 was still a relatively broad church containing an ideological diversity and fluidity reminiscent of Volunteering days. Indeed, the Yeomanry were largely based on the same membership constituency, with frequent continuity of individual or family service. They certainly included the Williamite tradition found in some Volunteer corps but it also encompassed much of the democratic and indeed radical volunteering spirit. Election of officers was common everywhere. Dublin Yeomen, whom Henry Joy McCracken thought ‘liberal’, also elected their captains despite governmental opposition. Even in Armagh, the cockpit of Orangeism, Yeomen varied from Diamond veterans in the Crowhill infantry to radical ex-Volunteers enrolled by Lord Charlemont despite quibbles over the oath and the inclusion of some erstwhile francophiles who had recently erected a liberty tree.
In 1796, there was no inconsistency about this. Grattan dubbed the Yeomanry ‘an ascendancy army’ but in reality the United Irishmen were in the ascendant while the loyalist response was fragmented and in danger of being overwhelmed. The initial priority was defence: to trawl in all varieties of loyalty and provide a structure to prevent people being neutralised or becoming United Irishmen.

More Catholics than Orangemen

The new Yeomanry was therefore a surprisingly diverse force, given its subsequent reputation. The government denied any intention of excluding Catholics or Presbyterians but the system already had the potential for denominational

and ideological filtering. Being a Yeoman was a desirable position conveying social status plus pay, clothing, arms and training. Applications exceeded places, which were limited by financial and security considerations. This meant selection locally and government reliance on local landowners’ judgement.
Sometimes recruits had no choice. In some areas only Protestants volunteered, in others the Catholic Committee sabotaged Catholic enlistment. In Loughinsholin, where Presbyterians offered Catholics withdrew and vice-versa. Where there was competition to enter a limited number of corps, choices were unavoidable. Downshire allowed Catholics in his cavalry but faced mutually exclusive Protestant and Catholic infantry offers from the same parishes and opted for the former. In Orange areas, some landowners deliberately selected their Yeomen directly from the local lodge. Occasionally a precarious balance was attempted by including proportions of Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter. The Farney corps in Monaghan started this way. However the first levy produced a predominantly Anglican force. There were Presbyterian Yeomen in mid-Ulster but the strength of the United Irishmen in eastern counties meant relatively few corps were raised there in 1796.
Wealthy, property-owning Catholics, on the other hand, were admitted into cavalry corps. There was an element of tokenism in this: Yeomanry offers of service sometimes highlighted Catholic members, which they never did for the Protestant denominations. In this way it can be estimated that at the very least ten per cent of the first national levy of 20,000 Yeomen were Catholic, thus outnumbering the Orange yeomen who in 1796 were only to be found in some corps in the Orange districts of mid-Ulster.
Forming a Yeomanry force in the deteriorating conditions of 1796 gave the initiative briefly back to Dublin Castle but this disappeared in the crisis following the Bantry Bay invasion attempt. The United Irishmen drew great encouragement from its near success and felt themselves strong enough to switch their policy on the Yeomanry from intimidation to infiltration. As a response, purges of Yeomanry corps began in Ulster and Leinster in the spring of 1797.

Orange links

Many Catholics were expelled from corps in Wicklow and Wexford on suspicion of being ‘United’. In mid-Ulster General John Knox devised a ‘test oath’ obliging Yeomen to publicly swear they were not United Irishmen. This got results and several corps were cleared of disaffected members. The Presbyterian secretary of the Farney corps was expelled following his confession of United Irish membership while Catholics were removed on the pretext of a political resolution they had issued. Knox followed up the expulsions by permitting augmentations of Orangemen into some northern corps. Although Orangemen quietly joined some corps in 1796 this was the first time they had official approval.
Knox clinched this by engineering Orange resolutions for Castle consumption. This was a risky strategy, given the recent disturbances in Armagh. Knox, a correspondent of the radical MP Arthur O’Connor, privately disapproved of Orangeism but believed the dangerous predicament he faced merited utilising it as a short-term expedient. However, with the United Irish-Defender alliance growing, the precedent inherent in this strategy would have profound and lasting consequences. Almost immediately, symptoms of polarisation appeared. A Tyrone clergyman noted approvingly, ‘Our parties are all obviously merged into two: loyalists and traitors’.

Castlereagh’s secret policy

However the critical Yeomanry-Orange connection was still to come. By 1798 Orangeism had been adopted by many northern gentry and spread to Dublin where a framework national organisation was established. As insurrection loomed, this provided a ready-made supply of loyal manpower. There were around 18,000 Yeomen in Ulster whereas the Orangemen were conservatively reckoned at 40,000. In March the Dublin leaders offered the Ulster Orangemen to the government if it would arm them. The viceroy, Camden, was scared of offending Catholics in the Militia and hestitated. However, the appointment of an Irishman—Lord Castlereagh—as acting chief secretary offered a solution. On 16 April 1798 he ordered northern Yeomanry commanders to organise 5,000 ‘supplementary’ men to be armed in an emergency. Camden and Castlereagh had privately decided that, where possible, these would be Orangemen.
In tandem with the supplementary plan, regular Yeomen were given a more military role. They were put on permanent duty and integrated into contingency plans for garrisoning key towns at the outbreak of trouble. This had one very important side-effect. In the cramped conditions of garrison life and the panic occasioned by the influx of rural loyalists, Orangeism spread like wildfire amongst both Yeomanry and regular units. This spontaneous, ground-level spread of Orangeism operated simultaneously with Castlereagh’s secret emergency policy to utilise Orange manpower in Ulster. The Yeomanry system proved the ideal facilitator for both.

Drum of the Aughnahoe[County Tyrone] Yeoman Infantry. (Reproduced with the kind permission of the Trustees of the Ulster Museum, Belfast)

On 1 July 1798 in the Presbyterian town of Belfast, once the epicentre of United Irish activity, it was noted that ‘Every man…has a red coat on’. This would have been inconceivable in 1796 when there was great difficulty enlisting Yeomen. However, it was now government policy to separate northern Presbyterians from the United Irishmen. Again the Yeomanry played a key role. Castlereagh admitted privately that the arrest of the Down United colonel, William Steel Dickson was an exception to ‘the policy of acting against the Catholick [sic] rather than the Presbyterian members of the union [United Irishmen]’. Government supporters industriously spread news of the Scullabogue massacre (See HI Autumn 1996) to stir up atavistic fears. The Yeomanry was expanded considerably to meet the emergency and ex-radicals were no longer discouraged. In effect, the Yeomanry functioned as a safety net. Joining up offered an acceptable and very public ‘way back’ for wavering radicals. Although there were some Presbyterian Yeomen in 1796, many more joined in mid-1798. Charlemont’s friend, the Anglican clergyman Edward Hudson, exploited a ‘schism’ between Presbyterian and Catholic to enlist the former in his Portglenone corps, sardonically noting ‘the brotherhood of affection is over’. By 1799, he claimed ‘the word “Protestant”, which was becoming obsolete in the north, has regained its influence and all of that description seem drawing closer together’. Thus the Yeomanry oath was often a rite of passage for Presbyterians keen to end their flirtation with revolution.

The 1798 rebellion had a profound impact on the psyche of Protestant Ireland, conjuring up anew spectres of 1641. When news of the rising hit Dublin, Camden described the apocalyptic atmosphere to Pitt. The rebellion

literally made the Protestant part of this country mad…it is scarcely possible to restrain the violence of my own immediate friends and advisors…they are prepared for extirpation and any appearance of lenity…raises a flame which runs like wildfire thro’ the streets.

Mercy was indeed scarce until Cornwallis replaced Camden and the rebellion was effectively crushed. Up to this juncture, the interests of most Protestants and the government were running parallel, a partnership potently symbolised by the Yeomanry, now blooded in the rebellion. Many embattled Protestants saw the parallel interests as identical: through the smouldering fires of rebellion they confused expediency with permanent policy.
Cornwallis, a professional soldier, voiced his contempt for the barbarity of the local amateur forces, particularly the Yeomanry. For many, criticism of the Yeomanry was construed as attacking Protestant interests. Yeomanry service under Camden and the relationship it represented was now seen as an unalterable ‘gold standard’. When government policy ran counter to perceived Protestant interests, loyalty was qualified with distrust and a feeling of betrayal. Camden was toasted as ‘the father of the Yeomanry’ while Cornwallis was lampooned as ‘Croppywallis’.

Lt. Col. William Blacker, Yeoman and Oraneman
(Dublin University Magazine 1841)

The Yeomanry and the Union

When it emerged that Pitt intended legislative union, antagonism towards Cornwallis sharpened. As union would remove emancipation from Ireland’s control, ultra-Protestant loyalty faced a severe test. Many Yeomen and Orangemen opposed the measure, particularly in Dublin where lawyers and merchants also faced a loss of professional and mercantile status. The Yeomanry, which it was claimed saved Ireland in 1798, were at the cutting edge of the anti-union campaign. A mutiny was threatened in Dublin with Volunteer-type rhetoric, but the bluster of 1782 proved hot air in post-rebellion Ireland. In the last analysis Protestants depended on the Yeomanry and the Yeomen depended on the government. The consequences of disbandment made union seem the lesser evil. Cornwallis rushed reinforcements to Dublin but the bluff had called itself.
Jonah Barrington later claimed the Volunteers were loyal to their country [Ireland] and their king while the Yeomen looked to ‘the king of England and his ministers’. Barrington’s jibe about patriotism was the peevish reaction of an incorrigible anti-unionist, yet a subtle alteration in the nature and focus of loyalty had occurred. The Volunteers’ ‘patriotism’ flourished in an atmosphere where they faced no real internal threat. While many Yeomen opposed the abolition of the Irish parliament, the experience of 1798 made challenging the executive a luxury they could not afford. On the surface, the switch of loyalty from College Green to Dublin Castle seemed relatively smooth: Yeomanry corps quickly adopted the post-1800 union flag in their colours. Yet, alongside this, a new focus of loyalty emerged to co-exist with this sometimes grudging allegiance. The ‘Protestant nationalism’ of 1782 was transformed into a clenching loyalty to the increasingly insecure interests of Irish Protestants.

Politicisation and Protestantism

The Yeomanry soon became a major component in post-union politics, a conduit between government and substantial numbers of Protestants who increasingly saw the force as symbolising the survival of their social and political position. They functioned as a political tool. When Hardwicke, the new viceroy, wanted to send a conciliatory message to nervous Protestants he reviewed the entire Dublin Yeomanry in Phoenix Park, then lavished hospitality on the officers in a banquet afterwards. It was a two-way process: Protestants could use the Yeomanry to put government in their debt. The continuance of war in 1803 meant a large increase in the Yeomanry from 63,000 to around 80,000. Emmet’s rising, coming when this augmentation was on foot, gave Protestants another opportunity to appear indispensable by extending their monopoly of the Yeomanry. The means by which this was accomplished ranged from high-level manoeuvring to parish pump politics.
As a partisan Yeomanry would be viewed in a poor light at Westminster, Hardwicke attempted a balance by considering some purely Catholic corps. However the Louth MP Fortesque threatened impeachment if he proceeded. Even the chief secretary, Wickham, considered Catholic corps ‘unsafe’ as they would inflame loyalist opinion and ‘be not cried but roared out against throughout all Ireland’. At a local level, Arthur Browne, the Prime Sergeant of Limerick, observed that Yeomanry corps in each town he passed on circuit effectively excluded Catholics by submitting prospective recruits to a ballot of existing members. This said, the Protestant monopoly was never total. Catholic Yeomen remained in areas of sparse Protestant settlement like Kerry. Moreover, there was still a scattering of liberal Protestants, usually at officer level, like Lieutenant Barnes of the Armagh Yeomanry. However, the general tendency was clear. When it became known Barnes had signed an emancipation petition, the privates mutinied and flung down their arms.

In the early nineteenth century, the passions generated by 1798 mixed with the politics of the Catholic Question. The continued existence of the Yeomanry allowed Protestants to demonstrate that their traditional control of law and order was intact as the campaign for emancipation built up. Yeomanry parades and the use of the force in assisting magistrates with mundane law and order matters assumed great symbolic importance as tangible manifestations of the fractures in Irish society. Yeomanry corps inevitably became involved in local clashes in an increasingly sectarianised atmosphere. In 1807, the government prevented Enniscorthy Yeomen celebrating the anniversary of the battle of Vinegar Hill as it raised sectarian tensions. In 1808 Yeomen were among a mob which disrupted a St John’s Eve bonfire and ‘garland’ near Newry, provoking a riot in which one man died. During the disturbances which swept Kerry and Limerick the same year, isolated Protestant Yeomen were singled out for attacks and arms raids. Since penal times, possession or dispossession of arms scored political points. Protestant insecurity and Catholic alienation fed off each other. O’Connell, ironically once a Yeoman himself, upped the ante by lambasting the force as symbolising a partisan magistracy.
The Yeomanry presented governments with a dilemma: was their strategic utility worth the political price? While war with France continued and the regular army was depleted for overseas service, they provided an important source of additional manpower and were particularly useful during invasion scares when they could free up the remaining regular garrison and maintain a local presence to deter co-ordinated action by the disaffected. Moreover, they served an unofficial purpose by keeping potentially turbulent Protestants under discipline.
The decision was deferred and the dilemma submerged. For much of the 1820s the Yeomanry lingered on, a rather moribund force seen by officials as a liability which could not be disbanded for fear of a Protestant reaction, particularly in Ulster where the force was numerically strongest. The advent of the denominationally inclusive County Constabulary in 1822 further touched Protestant insecurity by removing much of the functional justification for Yeomanry. There was no love lost between the two forces. In 1830 William McMullan of the Lurgan infantry was arrested by his own captain, yelling at the head of a mob rioting against the police, ‘we have plenty of arms and ammunition and can use them as well as you’. Ironically in that year the Whig chief secretary, Stanley, had decided to re-clothe and re-arm the Yeomanry as part of the response to the southern Tithe War. Stanley’s experiment proved disastrous as sectarian clashes developed.
In some districts the sight of a red coat was like a red rag to a bull. In 1831, the rescue of two heifers destrained for tithe sparked an appalling incident in Newtownbarry. A mob of locals tried to release the cattle, the magistrates called for Yeomanry and stones were thrown. When one Yeoman fell with a fractured skull, the others opened fire killing fourteen countrymen. The viceroy, Anglesey, tried to limit the political damage by initiating a progressive dismantling of the Yeomanry starting with a stand-down of the permanent sergeants which meant the Yeomen could no longer drill. This phasing-out took three years and was intentionally gradual, starving the Yeomanry of the oxygen of duty and pay, thus letting them pass away naturally if not gracefully. It was rightly felt this approach would be less likely to provoke a political reaction than sudden disbandment which, for a Protestant community coming to terms with emancipation, would have been like an amputation without anaesthetic.

Yeomanry belt plates – Glenauly [County Fermanagh]
Infantry and Belfast Merchant’s Crops. (Reproduced with the kind permission of the Trustees of the Ulster Museum, Belfast)

Although the Yeomanry’s official existence ended in 1834, the last rusty muskets were not removed from their dusty stores till the early 1840s. With unintentional but obvious symbolism, they were escorted to the ordnance stores by members of the new constabulary. Although gone, the Yeomen were most certainly not forgotten. For one thing, they were seen as the most recent manifestation of a tradition of Protestant self-defence stretching back to plantation requirements of armed service from tenants then re-surfacing in different forms such as the Williamite county associations, the eighteenth-century Boyne Societies, anti-Jacobite associations of 1745 and the Volunteers. Such identification had been eagerly promoted. At the foundation of an Apprentice Boys’ club in 1813, Colonel Blacker, a Yeoman and Orangeman, amalgamated the siege tradition, the Yeomanry and 1798 in a song entitled The Crimson Banner:

Again when treason maddened round,
and rebel hordes were swarming,
were Derry’s sons the foremost found,
for King and Country arming.

Moreover, the idea of a yeomanry remained as a structural template for local, gentry-led self-defence, particularly in Ulster. When volunteering was revived in Britain in 1859, northern Irish MPs like Sharman Crawford tried unsuccessfully to use the Yeomanry precedent to get similar Irish legislation. Yeomanry-like associations were mooted in the second Home Rule crisis of 1893. The Ulster Volunteer Force of 1911-14—often led by the same families like Knox of Dungannon—defined their role like Yeomen, giving priority to local defence and exhibiting great reluctance to leave their own districts for training in brigades.
The strong Orange-Yeomanry connection—itself part of a wider process of militarisation in Irish society—has left an enduring imprint on Orangeism which can be seen in the marching fife and drum bands and in various military regalia such as ceremonial swords and pikes. Even the name is still retained by the Moira Yeomanry Loyal Orange Lodge. The town or parish basis of Yeomanry corps mirrored the dynamics of the plantations and helped catapult the territorial mind-set of both ‘planter’ and ‘native’ into the nineteenth century and beyond. Weekly Yeomanry parades defined territory in the same way as rural drumming parties in the nineteenth century and marches, murals and coloured kerbstones in the twentieth.

Alan Blackstock works in the Public Records Office, Northern Ireland.

The formation of the Orange Order, 1795-98: the edited papers of Colonel William Blacker and Colonel Robert H. Wallace (Belfast 1994).

T. Bartlett, The Fall and Rise of the Irish Nation (Dublin 1992).

G. Broeker, Rural Disorder and Police Reform in Ireland, 1812-36 (London 1970).

H. Senior, Orangeism in Ireland and Britain, 1795-1836 (London and Toronto 1966).


Battle of Emmendingen, 19 October 1796 - History

This is a finding aid. It is a description of archival material held in the Wilson Library at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Unless otherwise noted, the materials described below are physically available in our reading room, and not digitally available through the World Wide Web. See the Duplication Policy section for more information.

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Veličina 1.0 feet of linear shelf space (approximately 372 items)
Sažetak Edmund Walter Jones (1811-1876) was a planter at Clover Hill in Happy Valley in Caldwell County, N.C. Early items in the collection are chiefly business and surveying papers of Edmund Walter Jones's father-in-law, William Davenport. The bulk of the papers is business and family correspondence of Jones, including letters from Lenoir, Jones, Patterson, and Avery relatives commenting on personal and public affairs papers related to E. W. Jones's speculation in military bounty lands in the Midwest wartime letters from his sons, William Davenport (b. 1839), John Thomas (1842-1864) and Walter L. (d. 1863), both of whom served in the 26th North Carolina Regiment, and Edmund (1848-1920), written from various locations in North Carolina and Virginia and a few letters from sons John Thomas and Edmund while students at the University of North Carolina. The postwar papers pertain to Edmund (1848-1920), planter in Happy Valley, lawyer in Lenoir, N.C., and state legislator. Volumes include land, surveying, and financial records of William Davenport, including a field survey book (typed transcript only), 1821, of the boundary line between North Carolina and Tennessee a memorandum book kept by Edmund Jones (1771-1844), father of Edmund Walter Jones, on a trip to Alabama in 1816 miscellaneous accounts and memoranda of E. W. Jones, including accounts of the building of Clover Hill and a clothing records for Company I, 26th North Carolina Regiment.
Creator Jones, Edmund Walter, 1811-1876.
Jezik Engleski
Povratak na vrh

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The following terms from Library of Congress Subject Headings suggest topics, persons, geography, etc. interspersed through the entire collection the terms do not usually represent discrete and easily identifiable portions of the collection--such as folders or items.

Clicking on a subject heading below will take you into the University Library's online catalog.

  • Avery family.
  • Bounties, Military--United States--History--Mexican War, 1846-1848.
  • Clover Hill Plantation (Caldwell County, N.C.)
  • College students--North Carolina--Social life and customs.
  • Konfederativne američke države. Army--Military life.
  • Konfederativne američke države. Vojska. North Carolina Infantry Regiment, 26th.
  • Davenport, William, fl. 1789-1821.
  • Family--North Carolina--Social life and customs.
  • Happy Valley (Caldwell County, N.C.)
  • Jones family.
  • Jones, Edmund Walter, 1811-1876.
  • Jones, Edmund, 1771-1844.
  • Jones, Edmund, 1848-1920.
  • Jones, John Thomas, 1842-1864.
  • Jones, Walter L., d. 1863.
  • Jones, William Davenport, b. 1839.
  • Jones, William Davenport, b. 1839.
  • Lawyers--North Carolina--History--19th century.
  • Lenoir (N.C.)--History--19th century.
  • Lenoir family.
  • North Carolina--Boundaries--Tennessee.
  • North Carolina--History--Civil War, 1861-1865.
  • North Carolina--Politics and government--1865-1950.
  • Patterson family.
  • Plantations--North Carolina--Caldwell County.
  • Real estate investment--United States--History--19th century.
  • Soldiers--Confederate States of America--Correspondence.
  • Southern States--Description and travel.
  • Surveyors--North Carolina--History.
  • Tennessee--Boundaries--North Carolina.
  • University of North Carolina (1793-1962)--Students--History--19th century.
  • Virginia--History--Civil War, 1861-1865.

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Edmund Walter Jones of Clover Hill, situated about six miles north of Lenoir in Caldwell County, N.C., was the son of Edmund Jones and his wife Ann Lenoir Jones of Palmyra. His grandfathers were William Lenoir and George Jones. Edmund Walter Jones married his cousin Sophia Caroline Davenport, daughter of William Davenport and his wife Mary Lenoir Gordon Davenport of The Fountain (or Walnut Fountain). All of these homes were located in Happy Valley in Caldwell County, N.C. Edmund Walter and Sophia Jones had four sons and one daughter: Colonel John T. Jones, who was killed at the Battle of the Wilderness on 6 May 1864 Private Walter L. Jones, who was mortally wounded at Gettysburg Captain William Davenport Jones, a member of General Collet Leventhorpe's staff who was also wounded and Edmund Jones, legislator and lawyer. Colonel John Thomas Jones served in the 1st North Carolina Volunteers and then as an officer in the 26th North Carolina Regiment under Zebulon B. Vance and Henry K. Burgwyn, and in the brigade of James Johnston Pettigrew. He was a lieutenant colonel when he was killed at the Battle of the Wilderness. Walter L. Jones attended Hillsboro Military Academy in 1860, became a soldier, and was killed at Gettysburg. Edmund Jones (1848-1920), called Edmund Jones, Jr. and nicknamed Coot, studied at Bingham Academy, served briefly in the 3rd North Carolina Cavalry in 1865, and after the war studied at the University of North Carolina and the University of Virginia. In later years, he farmed at Clover Hill, practiced law in Lenoir, and served in the N.C. legislature.

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The earlier papers are chiefly business and surveying papers of Edmund Walter Jones's father-in-law William Davenport. The bulk of the papers is business and family correspondence of Jones, including letters from Lenoir, Jones, Patterson, and Avery relatives commenting on personal and public affairs papers related to E. W. Jones's speculation in military bounty lands in the Midwest and wartime letters from his sons, William Davenport Jones, John Thomas Jones (1842-1864) and Walter L. Jones (d. 1863), both of whom served in the 26th North Carolina Regiment, and Edmund Jones (1848-1920), written from various locations in North Carolina and Virginia and a few letters from sons John Thomas and Edmund while students at the University of North Carolina. The postwar papers pertain to Edmund (1848-1920), planter in Happy Valley, N.C., lawyer in Lenoir, N.C., and state legislator.

Volumes include land, surveying, and financial records of William Davenport, including a field survey book (typed transcript only), 1821, of the boundary line between North Carolina and Tennessee a memorandum book kept by Edmund Jones (1771-1844), father of Edmund Walter Jones, on a trip to Alabama in 1816 miscellaneous accounts and memoranda of E. W. Jones, including accounts of the building of Clover Hill Plantation and a clothing records for Company I, 26th North Carolina Regiment.


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